
When the stern Hishām died on February 6, 743, at the age of fifty-two, his nephew al-Walīd was staying at his favorite desert residence of al-Azraq. The transfer of power appeared deceptively peaceful: although Hishām’s sons disliked their cousin, they did not dare to launch an open rebellion.

Al-Walīd II had awaited this moment with undisguised impatience. When messengers appeared on the horizon on February 11, his first orders were to release his “drinking companion” Iyād ibn Muslim imprisoned by Hishām for drunkenness and to seal the state treasury. Once caliph, he showed himself vindictive: the accounts of Hishām’s sons were frozen, and governors who had once advised Hishām to remove al-Walīd from the line of succession were immediately dismissed. On February 15 he made a ceremonial entry into Damascus to consolidate his authority.
Al-Walīd II’s reign brought the empire little glory. On the contrary, it became a string of setbacks: campaigns in Asia Minor faltered, and the strategically vital island of Cyprus effectively slipped under Byzantine influence.
In Khurāsān, by the caliph’s order, Yaḥyā ibn Zayd (a descendant of ʿAlī) was released, which immediately led to the emergence of a new center of Shiʿite resistance.
While vast sums were secretly funneled to Abbasid propagandists in Mecca (around 200,000 dirhams), the country was struck by natural disasters—floods in al-Jazīra, plague, and crop failure.
A wave of hatred rose against the caliph’s lifestyle, as he preferred wine and poetry to affairs of state. It was led by his cousin Yazīd III ibn al-Walīd. This was a clash of opposites: the pious Yazīd, who shared Muʿtazilite ideas about free will and personal responsibility, became the perfect antithesis to the “sinful” caliph.

To legitimize the overthrow of a lawful ruler, Yazīd spread a shocking rumor among the people: that a drunken al-Walīd, in a fit of blasphemy, had shot arrows at the Qurʾān. Although authoritative historians (al-Ṭabarī, al-Yaʿqūbī) do not confirm this episode, the “black propaganda” proved sufficient for the crowd. Al-Walīd II, blinded by his own carelessness, brushed aside reports of a brewing conspiracy.
On April 9, 744, Yazīd III secretly entered Damascus with a small group of supporters. A fatal mistake by the police chief Abū ʿAjāʾ—who was drunk that night and ignored reports of rebels—sealed the city’s fate.
The insurgents occupied the Great Mosque and then the palace without resistance. Seizing the treasury of 60,000 dinars, Yazīd immediately paid generous wages to the troops and hired reinforcements. In a single night, the capital, the postal service, and the arsenals fell into rebel hands.
Al-Walīd II learned of the capital’s fall with great delay. Even then he rejected proposals to retreat to fortified Tadmor (Palmyra), choosing instead to defend a small Byzantine outpost, al-Baḥra.
The forces were unequal: against about 1,500 rebels, the caliph had only some 800 warriors. The decisive blow was the betrayal of the influential al-ʿAbbās ibn al-Walīd, whose detachment was intercepted by the rebels. When al-ʿAbbās’s banner appeared in the enemy camp, the defenders’ morale collapsed.
On April 16, 744, the fortress was taken by storm. Al-Walīd II, realizing the end had come, demonstratively took up the Qurʾān, echoing the fate of Caliph ʿUthmān. When the warriors burst into the courtyard, he refused to draw his sword. One of the attackers struck the caliph in the face, after which his head was cut off.
The murder of al-Walīd II was unprecedented: for the first time in a century, a caliph fell by the hand of his own Muslim kinsman. This act finally shattered the sacred aura of Umayyad authority and opened the road to the chaos of the Third Fitna.



